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Boris I. Bittker *
In an earlier article, Professor Bittker argued that the Haig-Simons
economic definition of income would not be a useful basis for income
tax reform because it yields no help in dealing with many of the
most vexing problems, because its "no preference" approach would
lead to sweeping changes which would be unacceptable even to its
advocates, and because it gives no assistance in determining the
merits of suggested "preferences" or "exceptions" to its sweeping
inclusions. Professor Musgrave and Dr. Pechman in the Novem-
ber issue, and Dean Galvin in this issue, defended the concept
as a useful basis for tax reform, rejecting Professor Bittker's ad hoc
approach. This is Professor Bittker's answer to their challenges.
N "A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax Re-
form," published last year in this Review,' I examined the ma-
jor substantive areas of income tax law to see what changes would
be required if the overriding aim of tax reform were a "compre-
hensive tax base" (CTB) without "preferences," "exceptions,"
or "special provisions." My exploration was stimulated by the
fact that the major organizing principle in most serious discussions
of tax reform since World War II has been the CTB concept,
whose exponents have been increasingly arguing that a ruthless
suppression of all "preferences," no matter how seductive their
appeals, is the only feasible road to a simplified and improved
income tax structure. I summarized my conclusions as follows: 2
For reasons that will be set out in more detail hereafter, I have
concluded that a systematic and rigorous application of the "no
preference" or CTB approach would require many more sweeping
changes in the existing tax structure than have been acknowledged.
I also believe that many of these changes would be quite unaccept-
able, despite their conformity to the Haig-Simons definition, to
many of those who are attracted, in the abstract, by the idea of
a CTB. At the same time, there are in my view many more ambi-
guities in the concept than have been acknowledged, and at these
points it sheds less light than some of its supporters seem to claim.
Some alleged "preferences," in other words, are as compatible
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Cornell, z938; LL.B.,
Yale, 1941.
8o HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bittker].
2 Bittker 934.
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with the Haig-Simons definition as their elimination would be.
Finally, those who continue, in defiance of all experience, to hope
for a simplified tax structure in a complex society are doubly de-
luded, in my view, if they believe that a CTB will make a signifi-
cant contribution to simplification. Most of our troublesome com-
plexities concern issues that are either independent of the defini-
tional criteria or unavoidable once we accept the departures that
even the most committed believers in a CTB accept as desirable
or necessary.
My views evoked responses by Professor Musgrave and Dr.
Pechman in the November 1967 issue of this Review, and by Dean
Galvin in the present issue.' I should like to comment briefly on
their responses, while simultaneously expressing the hope that in-
terested readers will go back to the original article rather than
confine themselves to this truncated summary.
Despite Musgrave's intimations, I do not reject the Haig-
Simons definition as "an analytical tool." To the contrary, this is
precisely the purpose to which I put the definition in exploring
its implications throughout a wide range of specific issues. Having
done so, I concluded that a systematically defined CTB would
require many more drastic changes than have been acknowl-
edged, and that many of these changes would be unpalatable to
many professed advocates of the Haig-Simons definition. I can-
not ascertain whether Musgrave disagrees with either (or both)
of these conclusions, since he discloses his view on only a few
of the items discussed in my article. He agrees that the Haig-
Simons definition requires inclusion of noncash benefits from
public services, gifts, bequests, unrealized appreciation, and im-
puted income from assets, accrual accounting for all income, and
repeal of the separate corporate income tax; and he evidently
would favor these changes to the extent "administratively feas-
ible." ' By sedulously qualifying almost every conclusion with
I Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REv. 44 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Musgrave]; Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A
Comment, 81 HAv. L. REv. 63 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Pechman]; Galvin,
More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of
Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HAtav. L. Rv. ior6 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Galvin].
'As to transfer payments, Musgrave says that "feasibility" suggests taxing
only cash grants. Musgrave 55. He would evidently recognize unrealized ap-
predation (and depreciation?) on marketable securities, but doubts the feasibility
of reaching other assets; he favors taxing imputed rent, but not imputed income
from other assets; and I am not sure of his view on the feasibility of accrual ac-
counting for all income.
For Musgrave's position on the corporate tax see note 17 infra.
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such phrases as "ideally," "conceptually," and "in principle,"
however, Musgrave leaves the door open for a quick escape in
practice; and this, coupled with his silence on so many other
specific issues, makes it hard to know how faithfully he would
follow his Platonic, or Hegelian, ideal. One can infer from Mus-
grave's scanty affirmative commitments, however, that he- like
other CTB enthusiasts - has a capacious knapsack of arguments
to support a wide range of departures from the Haig-Simons def-
inition.
Thus, the encouragement of "general capital formation and
economic growth" is the purpose and justification for the invest-
ment credit, a tax provision that is "very different," we are told,
from percentage depletion.5 Does the difference lie in the ad-
jective "general" as applied to the investment credit's contribu-
tion to investment? Well, not exactly: it "may be desirable" to
use tax concessions to encourage investment in "particular in-
dustries or types of assets." (One can hardly approve of the in-
vestment credit of existing law unless one is prepared to accept
such distinctions, since it distinguishes among taxpayers and
takes account of the type, life, location, physical character, in-
dustrial use, and other features of the property.6) But don't na-
tural resources qualify as "particular industries"? Well, "even if
there were a case for special aid, such aid is not granted effectively
as a tax subsidy to gross income." Why not? Perhaps it is be-
cause percentage depletion confers benefits "which Congress
would not be willing to give in explicit form" so that "faith in
the democratic process suggests that the subsidy approach [that
is, direct cash grants] is superior." But this objection (explic-
itly employed by Musgrave in his criticism of the deduction for
charitable contributions 7) seems equally applicable to the invest-
ment credit. Is it seriously contended that Congress would have
5Musgrave 57-58.
6 INT. REV. CODE OF '954, § 48. The investment credit as granted by recent
treaties for American industry abroad also makes some nice distinctions, industry-
by-industry and country-by-country. Thus, a credit is allowed for building a
hotel in Israel but not for one in Thailand, for a gas and electric plant in Thai-
land but not for one in Brazil, and for a mineral smelting and refining facility
in Brazil but not (to complete the circle) for one in Israel. Moreover, none
of these installations would qualify for an investment credit if built in the
United States, so far as their buildings and structural components (other than
elevators and escalators) are concerned. Finally, no investment credit is to be
allowed for investment in the Philippines, although its state of development is
comparable to that of some of the countries that do qualify for the credit.
7 Musgrave 57.
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been willing to appropriate 1.3 billion dollars in 1964 as direct
cash grants to the 330,000 corporations 8 making the investments
specified by section 48 of the Code?
Another illustration: Musgrave favors deductions "for dis-
aster expenses, be they medical costs, disaster losses, or what
not" to allow for "situations where taxpayers with equal incomes
and family size have strikingly different needs." " Fidelity to the
Haig-Simons definition would lead to the conclusion, it seems to
me, that damage to one's personal automobile by collision, fire,
or theft is a form of consumption, like depreciation through use;
and that a taxpayer who prefers to assume these risks himself
rather than procure insurance against them should not expect the
tax system to bail him out if his choice backfires. Moreover,
one might also expect the application to medical expenses and
casualty losses of the other criteria that Musgrave offers for test-
ing the propriety of tax allowances: (i) the irrationality (as he
sees it, in discussing the deduction of charitable contributions)
of an allowance whose value increases with the taxpayer's
income; (2) the likelihood that Congress would have been willing
to grant a direct subsidy; and (3) the availability of alternative
devices (like insurance, public or private). Judged by these
standards, a tax allowance for "disaster expenses" does not rate
very high.
The same paradox - an insistence that the Haig-Simons defi-
nition will keep us from getting lost in a miasma of ad hoc judg-
ments, coupled with departures from that definition for "reasons"
that are no more than vague, and sometimes inconsistent, intui-
tions- appears in Musgrave's support for adjustments to take
account of "differences in the ability to pay of taxable units of
unequal size," his tolerant view of tax postponement, and his
' Only about 25% of the 14 million active corporations claimed the credit.
U.S. TRAmsuRY DEP'T, Pun. No. 159, STATIS icS oF INcom- 1964 (CoRPoRATIoN
INcomE TAx R TurNs, PRLM&INARY), Table C.
As originally proposed by the Treasury, the investment credit was geared to
the taxpayer's depreciation deductions (izs of investment in excess of depre-
ciation and 6% of investment between 5o and ioo% of depreciation) in order
to focus "on investment which would not have been undertaken without this
inducement, and which will be most responsive to the stimulus which it pro-
vides." Statement by Secretary Douglas Dillon in Hearings on the President's
rg6r Tax Message Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., ist
Sess. 26 (i96r). Although the theory is superficially plausible, I am by no means
sure that sensitivity to an incentive for future investment is closely related to the
taxpayer's deductions for past investments. Whether the Treasury's xg6i theory
was correct or not, however, the investment credit as enacted is not very efficient.
9 Musgrave 56.
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comments on other specific points. Musgrave's submission, there-
fore, seems to me to support, rather than undermine, my earlier
conclusion that 10
[the reasons offered by CTB advocates] for departing from the
Haig-Simons definition are, in my opinion, no different from the
reasons that are offered in support of all of the "preferences" of
existing law: the necessity or desirability of avoiding difficulties in
valuation or enforcement, of stimulating economic growth, of
encouraging behavior thought to be socially useful, of alleviating
economic hardship, of retaining the freedom of choice that results
from use of tax concessions rather than some other governmental
mechanism, or of pursuing other social policies.
Pechman makes two major criticisms of my views, one con-
cerning the scope of the Haig-Simons definition and the second
concerning the criteria for departing from it." His first point
is: 12
Since income is a flow of receipts per unit of time, the term income
alone has two dimensions. A third dimension of the tax computa-
tion is the taxable unit, and a fourth the personal deductions.
While there are problems in identifying the receipts to be included
in income, the income concept is neutral regarding (i) the time
interval over which income should be measured, (2) the proper
unit of taxation, and (3) the personal deductions that might be
allowed for income tax purposes. Most of Professor Bittker's dis-
course is concerned with these three dimensions, which are not
supplied by any definition of income, comprehensive or otherwise.
10 Bittker 981.
" Pechman also takes exception to two comments in my preliminary remarks:
he asserts that no one has used the NID concept of personal income as a "norma-
tive model" for a CTB, and that my reference to certain provisions of the Code
as a way of putting the Haig-Simons definition into statutory language "can only
be regarded as an attempt to confuse the issue." As to the NID's conceptual
framework, I cited examples (Bittker 933 n.7) of what I described as "an in-
cipient tendency" to use it "with some modifications" as a normative model. (One
was a statement by Galvin, who does not repudiate my characterization in his
response.) Perhaps Pechman and I can agree on this medieval formula: if there
be any abroad in the land who favor the normative heresy, either in thought
or in expression, let them be anathema. Turning to what Pechman describes as
an "attempt to confuse the issue" by suggesting that §§ 6x(a), x62, x66, x67
and 212 of the Code could be used to define a taxable base corresponding to the
Haig-Simons definition, I am unrepentant. They could be so used.
"2Pechman 65-66. Although the Haig-Simons definition may have more
relevance to the issues mentioned by Pechman than he is prepared to concede, it
does, in my opinion, shed less light on many issues than CTB advocates seem to
claim. The dimmer its light, the less it will aid us in improving the tax structure.
[Vol. 8i1:1o321036
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In response, I submit that if I belabored the obvious, it was
because the advocates of a CTB - Pechman included - have
in the past argued that the "income concept" is not neutral as to
these issues, and I doubt very much that Pechman's latter-day
revisionism will be generally accepted. As to personal deductions
(medical expenses, casualty losses, interest, taxes, charitable con-
tributions, nonbusiness bad debts, etc.), it has been a central
tenet of CTB philosophy, stemming from Henry Simons him-
self, that no account should be taken, in defining income, of the
way the taxpayer spends his resources. If evidence for this ele-
mentary point is required, one need go no farther afield than
Pechman's 1959 estimate of the yield of a comprehensive in-
dividual income tax "[i ] f all the eroding features of the tax law
had been eliminated." 11 Of 18 proposed changes, 6 concern the
personal deductions, accounting for almost half of the estimated
increase in the base and yield.
Turning to "the proper unit of taxation," another "dimension"
that Pechman says is not "supplied by any definition of income,
comprehensive or otherwise," there is a bit more room for de-
bate. Pechman evidently agrees with me that the Haig-Simons
definition tells us nothing about whether the individual, the
married couple, the family, or the household should be the tax-
able unit. Musgrave is more cautious: he agrees that "the prob-
lem of formulating the taxable unit is not solved by the income
concept," but he intimates that there is some relationship be-
tween the two issues.' 4 As explained by Galvin, however, the
Haig-Simons definition takes the individual as the proper taxable
unit.' 5 The Canadian Royal Commission Report, on the other
hand, argues that income should be computed on a "family
unit" basis.' 6 When the advocates of a CTB exhibit this much
diversity about the relationship between the Haig-Simons defini-
tion and the proper taxable unit, I am puzzled by Pechman's
allegation that I have misunderstood "what the Haig-Simons
definition of income does and does not imply."
11 Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?,
in I HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86m CONG., IST SESS., TAX REvisioN
COIUENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING TaE TAX BASE 251, 279 (Comm. Print
1959).
14Musgrave 6o-6i.
'n Galvin ioi7. If the proper tax unit is the individual, taken in isolation, the
Haig-Simons definition would include the value of support furnished to the tax-
payer by parents, spouse, etc. See Bittker 946-47.
183 REPORT OF = RoYAL Com'e" ON TAxAaioN (Canada) 117-49 (1966).
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Moreover, my discussion of "taxable unit" was not confined to
family relationships, but included comments on the proper treat-
ment of partnerships, corporations, and trusts. Pechman may
believe that the Haig-Simons definition is "neutral" as to this
"dimension" of income, but I think that most CTB advocates
would agree with Musgrave and the Canadian Royal Commission
that the definition requires these legal entities to be treated as
intermediaries, and their income to be imputed currently to their
shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries.17
As to timing, another "dimension" that Pechman says I have
belabored needlessly because the Haig-Simons definition is neu-
tral on the point, I described at length in the original article the
ambivalent response of CTB advocates to problems in this area.
For example: they often derive from the Haig-Simons definition
the conclusion that an employer's contribution to pension and
profit-sharing plans should be taxed currently to the employee
rather than when the cash benefits are received, but simultane-
ously favor taxing social security benefits on receipt rather than
when the benefits accrue. Assuming for the moment that cash
basis accounting can be reconciled with what Musgrave properly
calls "the accretion concept," shifting back and forth between
accruals and cash receipts as the measure of income seems to re-
quire some justification.
Like Musgrave, Pechman evidently thinks that proponents of
the CTB approach can depart from the Haig-Simons definition with-
out bogging down in the quagmire of ad hoc judgments that they see
as the outcome of my skepticism. They can attain this happy
state of objectivity because 18
174 id. at 3-44; Musgrave 6i. I argued (Bittker 978) that the CTB approach
would require unrealized appreciation or depredation in the value of stock to be
reported currently or, if this is rejected as not feasible, it would suggest that
retained earnings should be imputed to the shareholder. Musgrave favors doing
both, a proposal I do not understand. If retained earnings are reflected in an
increase in the value of the stock, they would be taken into account as part of
the shareholder's net accretion for the taxable year; if, on the other hand, the
retained earnings are for some reason not reflected in an increase in the value of
the stock, how can an imputation of the earnings to the shareholders be squared
with a net accretion concept of income? Of course, by treating Musgrave's double-
barreled proposal as circular, one can reconcile it with the accretion concept.
Thus, assume that A buys stock on Jan. x for $zoo, the corporation earns and
retains $3o, and the stock is worth $125 on Dec. 31. A is taxed on $3o of retained
earnings, but is allowed to deduct $5 of unrealized depreciation (i.e., adjusted
basis of $I3O less Dec. 3X value of $X25). Net result: $25 of income. The same
result would be reached more directly, however, by merely taking account of the
appreciation in value, and not bothering to impute the retained earnings.1 8 Pechman 66.
[VOL 81:1o321038
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departures from comprehensiveness are permitted by the propo-
nents [of the CTB, who] . . . have even stipulated the conditions
under which departures would be tolerated. These conditions are,
first, that the departure must promote a major national objective
and that the tax mechanism is the most efficient method of achiev-
ing it; or, second, it is impractical to tax the particular item.
Could the investment credit - which makes no effort to sep-
arate taxpayers who will invest only if they get an incentive from
those who will invest anyway 19 -meet these conditions? One
can certainly say of the investment credit that it proved to be a
politically successful method of achieving its result, and some
may well believe that the "waste" is outweighed by the gain. If
it is "the most efficient method" of expanding private invest-
ment, however, "efficiency" is a sufficiently expansive criterion
to embrace percentage depletion, the exemption of municipal
bond interest, the deduction of intangible drilling and develop-
ment expenses, the charitable contribution deduction, and many
other provisions of existing law that are distasteful to CTB ad-
vocates. If, on the other hand, Pechman's conditions are intended
as strict guardians of the commonweal, they spell the doom of ac-
celerated depreciation, the 1962 shorter-than-real-life depreciation
guidelines, the write-off or rapid amortization of research and ex-
perimental costs, tax-free exchanges, and many other provisions.
It would clarify the debate immeasurably if Pechman had
applied his conditions to the numerous issues discussed in my
article so that the interested spectator could judge for himself
just how strictly we are asked to apply the criteria of "major
national objectives" and "most efficient method of achieving
them." Does Pechman believe that the scores of provisions omit-
ted from his 1959 list of "all the eroding features" of the tax
structure 20 either (a) are the "most efficient method" of achiev-
ing a "major national objective," or (b) are required in the in-
terest of administrative practicality?
Finally, Pechman finds in the report of the Canadian Royal
Commission on Taxation a rebuttal to my criticisms of the CTB
movement. I would argue, to the contrary, that this massive effort
to apply the CTB principle throughout an income tax structure
supports my conclusion that "a systematic and rigorous appli-
cation of the 'no preference' or CTB approach would require
many more sweeping changes in the existing tax structure than
"9 See note 8 supra.
0See Pechman, supra note 13, at 279.
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have been acknowledged." Among the numerous changes that are
thought by the Canadian Report to follow from the Haig-Simons
definition are: integration of the corporate tax into the individual
tax, aggregation of family income, taxation of capital gains at
regular rates, and the inclusion in income of gifts, bequests,
mortality gains on life insurance, patronage refunds, mutual in-
surance dividends, and recoveries in personal injury cases. Some
of these proposals are either omitted or barely hinted at by the
extensive CTB literature, and capital gain reform is the only one
included in Pechman's estimate of a comprehensive tax base's
potential yield.21
As to lawyers, the group I know best, I think that the Canadian
Report also bears out another conclusion I expressed in the ar-
ticle, that is, that "many of these changes [to achieve a CTB]
would be quite unacceptable, despite their conformity to the
Haig-Simons definition, to many of those who are attracted, in
the abstract, by the idea of a CTB." Although this is not the
place for even a cursory examination of the Canadian report, it
should be noted that its strides toward a CTB (which are un-
questionably bold) are partly countered by several major anti-
CTB recommendations (for example, liberal write-offs of business
costs, including some capital outlays; the device of the income
adjustment account; concessions for college tuition; lenient ac-
ceptance of business accounting practices; tax postponement
through retirement income plans; and the election to take ac-
count of unrealized appreciation or depreciation on certain as-
sets).22
In his comments in this issue of the Review, Galvin argues that
my "suggestion of ad hoc settlements will get us nowhere" and
that "[w]e have had a surfeit of patchwork and piecemeal ef-
forts; a normative concept must be sought . . . ." I certainly
sympathize with Galvin's exasperation, and I hope that his search
21Id. Pechman's list includes full taxation of capital gains; as to life in-
surance, he includes the interest component of insurance savings, but not mortality
gains. For the difference see Bittker 943-44.
Integration of the corporate tax would be extremely costly; but this is another
way of saying that it ought to be at the top of the reform list because it departs
so dramatically from the CTB ideal.
It may be, of course, that some CTB advocates believe that these items are
the most efficient methods of achieving major national objectives and hence meet
Pechman's conditions for a departure from a CTB.
2 See Bittker, The Comprehensive Income Tax Base and the Report of the
Royal Commission on Taxation (Address delivered to the Annual Conference of
the Canadian Tax Foundation, Montreal, Nov. 27-29, x967).
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for an encompassing verity does not lead him into that "dank, mias-
mic, myxomycetous sump" that Musgrave, Pechman, and he
would probably like to call "Bittker's Quagmire." If Galvin
plans to avoid it by following the CTB route wherever it may
lead, however, I think he will have to confront the troublesome
issues discussed in my article; and if he consistently prescribes
the remedies that the Haig-Simons definition requires, I doubt
if it will be possible to muster a corporal's guard in the ABA Tax
Section to parade at the unveiling of the proposals. Perhaps, on
the other hand, the proposed new tax structure will allow a roll-
over of investments, an immediate write-off of the cost of business
plant and equipment, and other departures from the Haig-Simons
definition for such reasons as "the necessity or desirability of
avoiding difficulties in valuation or enforcement, of stimulating
economic growth, of encouraging behavior thought to be socially
useful, of alleviating economic hardship, of retaining the freedom
of choice that results from use of tax concessions rather than some
other governmental mechanism, or of pursuing other social poli-
cies." 23 If Galvin takes this route, he will, I think, soon find
himself - as though drawn by an ignis fatuus - in the swamp
he hopes to avoid. In short, if we want a program for tax re-
form, rather than a classroom construct, I can see no escape from
"an examination of each [issue] on its merits in a discouragingly
inconclusive process that can derive no significant assistance
from a 'no preference' presumption that would at best be applied
only on a wholly selective basis." 24
Galvin has high hopes for the computer-aided ABA study de-
scribed in his article, which (if it gets the financing that will be
necessary) unquestionably could make an important contribu-
tion to our knowledge of this area. If the study confines itself
to the raw data that are most readily available, however, it will
produce disappointingly limited results- which are likely to be
"tilted," as Galvin points out, against employees and other per-




25 Galvin 1026. Though the "tilt" hardly needs documentation, mention might
be made of Gurley's recent estimate that capital gains during the period i955-
1965 amounted to $6o billion annually, of which only $io billion was realized and
reported. Gurley, Federal Tax Policy, 2o NAT'L TAx J. 319, 320 (z967). See also
Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock,
76 YALEa L.J. 623, 631-32 (1967), estimating that inclusion of appreciation on
publicly held stock as ordinary income would have increased the individual in-
come tax yield in 1965 by at least $15 to $26 billion (from $49 billion). If
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One hopes, therefore, that the initial output of this pilot project
will be distinctly labeled as experimental, and that it will be
followed by an effort to correct the "tilt" by seeing what kind
of a tax burden would result from a more systematic pursuit of
the CTB ideal. If the difficult items (annual increases in net
worth, gifts and bequests, imputed income from personal assets,
accrual accounting, depreciation tied to losses in market value,
etc.) are taken into account at the best estimates available, we will
for the first time have an econometric model based on the Haig-
Simons definition. It will then be possible to measure the effects
(horizontally and vertically) of specific departures from that def-
inition.
I suggested in my original article that we might discover, once
we had such a macroeconomic model, that a system of counter-
vailing "preferences" might produce a distribution of the tax
burden conforming more closely to the professed ideal of the CTB
advocates than an undiscriminating elimination of those "pref-
these estimates are even roughly correct, the "tilt" might be characterized more
accurately as abject obeisance; and with the tax structure in this posture, I
would not rank the exclusion of unemployment compensation, strike benefits,
employee death benefits, or social security payments very high on the list of
"preferences" to be eliminated in order to achieve what will in any event be
a noncomprehensive CTB.
Constructive realization at death-which may be many years after a gain
has accrued- would make only an insignificant contribution toward correcting
the bias just described. See Bittker 97o-7i. Musgrave concedes this shortcoming
in constructive realization and would remedy it by "applying an interest charge
when the tax becomes due." Musgrave 6o. If stock purchased by the taxpayer
for $io,ooo in 195o is worth $zoo,ooo on his death in i97o, I do not know whether
Musgrave would compute the proposed interest charge (z) by calculating each
intervening year's unrealized gain (or loss) and carrying forward an annual in-
terest charge (or credit) on each year's hypothetical tax, to be applied against
the tax on the $9o,ooo of gain constructively realized at death; (2) by assuming
that the $9o,ooo of gain accrued in equal annual installments over the taxpayer's
holding period (or that it accrued all at once at the mid-point), and adding to
the tax in the year of death an interest charge related to this hypothetical post-
ponement; or (3) by employing some other assumptions. The first method pre-
supposes an ability to compute the annual unrealized appreciation or depreciation
on the asset in question- although it has been a tenet of the CTB movement
that this is so impractical that taxpayers cannot be put on an annual accrual
method. The second method, however, would not really be a fee for postpone-
ment: the entire $9o,ooo of gain might have arisen in the year of the taxpayer's
death. Both methods, it should be noted, may result in a tax burden ex-
ceeding the gain, or even the value of the asset, at the time the tax is imposed.
One suspects that it will be some time before Musgrave's improvement on con-
structive realization is enacted; that may be the proper time to correct the ero-
sion of the tax base caused by the exclusion of unemployment compensation and
strike benefits.
[Vol. 81 :10321042
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erences" that happen to be vulnerable at a particular time.26 Al-
though I cannot prove that this judgment is correct, it seems to
me more plausible than the contrary assumption that the elimi-
nation of any preference, even if it is enjoyed only by a gen-
erally disfavored group, will be an improvement. In any event,
I should think that all would welcome a test of these competing
hypotheses.
26 Bittker 983-84.
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